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Abstract: Crump et al.’s framework is a powerful tool designed to assist decisions on the
ethical treatment of decapod crustaceans. However, the question of whether decapods are
sentient (i.e., whether they feel), remains open, perhaps indefinitely. More optimistically, we
might design experiments that distinguish among different levels of awareness, sometimes
viewed as components of sentience. We should strike a balance between assuming that all
organisms are sentient and making unnecessary anatomical assumptions about sentience.
Refining current experiments may provide concrete insights about awareness in Decapoda
and other taxa.
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1. A framework to assist ethical decisions. Crump et al.’s (2022) framework concerning
sentience in decapods is motivated by the need to treat animals ethically. It addresses the
epistemic component (Birch 2017) of the precautionary principle: taking into account what
we know about their anatomy and behavior, how credible is it that decapods could be
sentient? Their tentative answer is that some decapods might feel pain.
The framework has practical utility but, it is important not to lose sight of how it should be
used scientifically. It is not designed to answer conclusively whether decapods are sentient.
Rather, it summarizes, using a graded scale, the accumulated pieces of evidence (a mixture of
neurological prerequisites and behavioral signs) that are viewed as compatible with the
possibility that decapods are sentient. The risk is that this is interpreted – especially outside
the scientific community – to mean that sentience is the best explanation for decapod
behavior (or the behavior of any organism). In fact, this has not been established at all. From
a purely curiosity-driven perspective, the question remains open.
If we assume that ethical expediencies such as those underlying Crump et al.’s framework
have really answered the question of decapod sentience we risk stifling further research into
an especially fascinating set of questions. To show that this is still an open question. I will
discuss a few concepts that are central to the decapod sentience framework.

2. The definition and scope of sentience. This is perhaps the trickiest aspect of animal
sentience – what does it actually mean? Often it is defined as the ability to experience feelings
(e.g. Smith & Boyd 1991, Birch et al. 2021, Crump et al. 2022, and by this journal, a “journal
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on animal feeling”). But there are also wider definitions, encompassing various levels of
awareness (e.g. Broom 2007 [cf. Broom 2016], Elwood 2022a). Crump et al. do not include
awareness in their narrower definition of sentience, but they have also broadened the
definition in another way by including sensory experiences under the umbrella term
“feelings.”
The meaning of “experiences” here is not fully resolved. But simply having a sensory channel
– a change in cell membrane polarity on the arrival of a photon for example – is not the same
as having feelings. There certainly might be feelings associated with the detection of light, but
the fact that we can observe a behavioral response to light does not mean that feelings must
have been involved. In most cases the relations between stimuli and behavior (or other
biological responses) can be explained in simpler ways without recourse to feeling (Briffa
2022, Elwood 2022b).
A second problem with opening up the scope of sentience to include any animal that can
respond to stimuli is that this would mean that all animals are sentient – which is exactly
what is advocated by the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) theory (see the commentary of
Reber et al. 2022). As with all theories, we need evidence, provided by hypothesis-driven
tests, before we can decide whether we should accept them.
Nor does extending “sentience” to all organisms solve the problem of defining it. Although
there is general acceptance that sentience is about feelings I think we still lack a clear
definition (which would also have to include a definition of “feelings”). I have proposed a
starting point (Briffa 2022) whereby sentience could encompass feelings as well as the two
higher levels of awareness described by Broom (2007): assessment awareness (insight) and
executive awareness (hypothesizing about the future). In contrast, perceptual awareness
(detecting stimuli) and cognitive awareness (using stored information) seem to describe basic
cognitive functions common to all animals (Shettleworth 2001). As such they do not relate to
the functions that most people would recognize as sentient.

3. Criteria for sentience: Assumptions versus evidence. I am accordingly unsure that I would
go as far as Reber et al., equating sentience with the ability to respond to stimuli. Rather (once
we have first agreed on a definition of sentience), I would prefer to derive some predicted
indicators of sentience – behavioral or other biological properties, for which feelings or higher
levels of awareness would be the simplest valid explanation – and then look for evidence of
those indicators in any study species of interest. For this reason, although I think that
assumptions about the ability to detect and respond to stimuli are too loose, I think another
one of Crump et al.’s assumptions is too restrictive. Their criteria for sentience, developed
from Smith and Boyd (1991), actually contain a mixture of signs of sentience and prerequisites
for sentence, the latter based on assumptions about the neural machinery that would be
required to generate it. Crump et al. assume that certain brain regions within a centralized
nervous system have to be present because information gathered across different channels
cannot be integrated in their absence. The ability to integrate different information sources
certainly seems like a prerequisite for sentience); but the assumption that specific brain
structures are needed to achieve this seems unnecessary.
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Figure 1: Cubozoan visual system (Tripedalia cystophora) (from Bielecki et al. 2014)
(A) Position of a rhopalium, (B) detail: Upper and lower lens eyes (ULE, LLE), pit eye (PE), slit eye (SE) and light
sensitive neuropil ring (NP). PE and SE occur in pairs, either side of the lens eyes.

For example, cnidarians have a diffuse nerve net, with some regions of increased neural
density and a degree of specialization (Bosch et al. 2017). Because they lack a centralized
nervous system of the type possessed by bilateral animals, Crump et al. assume that they
cannot integrate information. Yet cnidarians gather information through a variety of channels
using complex sense organs (Bosch et al. 2017), and they store information (Cheng 2022); so
it seems unlikely that they are not adapted to integrate the different sources of information
they can access. Box jellyfish (Cubozoa) like Tripedalia cystophora (Bielecki et al. 2014) have
24 eyes of four different types, concentrated into four external visual organs (rhopalia; Figure
1), each containing six eyes. The different eye types within each of the four rhopalia, gather
different types of visual information, used for different purposes including navigation (Garm
et al. 2011) and regulation of swimming speed via neural integration with the pacemaker
system (Garm & Bielecki 2008). Different classes of visual information are not the only sensory
channel used by cnidarians. In another cubomedusoid, Carybdea sivickisi, successful transfer
of a spermatophore during copulation involves coordinated responses to both intraspecific
visual signals and tactile cues (Bosch et al. 2017).
Examples like this demonstrate that we should avoid overgeneralizing when deciding which
types of animal might be worth investigating for signs of sentience. Rather than assuming
either that all are sentient or that sentience can only be present in animals with particular
neural architecture, I suggest approaching any study species of interest with a skeptical but
open mind. At the same time, I agree with Comstock (2022) that we should be careful about
extrapolating on the basis of disparate information from a relatively restricted range of
examples to ascribe sentience to an entire taxon (e.g. Decapoda).
4. Open questions. As Crump et al. point out, robust deductive evidence about decapod
sentience is limited. Indeed, it has been argued that the question of animal sentience should
be exempted from the normal level of uncertainty (5% and less) regarded as acceptable in
biology (by the target article, Birch et al. 2021 and Ng 2022). The argument for exemption is
actually based on two principles, which are rarely distinguished from one another:
First, there are circumstances in which addressing a potential ethical concern is more
important than satisfying our curiosity (Birch 2017). Second, in the context of curiosity-driven
science there is a pessimistic view that questions about decapod sentience may not be
amenable to standard scientific approaches. Regarding direct access to animal feelings, this
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may be true, and the best we can do is test for behavior that is consistent with pain (Elwood
2019) but consistent also with other explanations.
I am more optimistic, however, about making and testing hypotheses to distinguish between
different types of awareness in decapods. Taking Broom’s (2007) criteria as a starting point,
we could design experiments to distinguish between patterns of behaviour predicted by
perceptual and cognitive awareness versus assessment and executive awareness. Crump et
al.’s target article shows that excellent model systems for addressing this open question can
be found within the Decapoda.
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